The paper analyzes one-sector models of general equilibrium over an infinite time horizon in which there are an infinite number of agents, these being the members of successive generations.
Introduction
This article has a dual purpose.
Its immediate aim is to give further results on infinite horizon or "open ended" equilibrium models of the type first studied by Samuelson C 7] and later elaborated on by Diamond [&] and Cabs and Yaari [SjjCH] .
Like those works, it will pay special attention to the nonoptimalities which can occur in such models and which have been termed "paradoxical" since they contradict well known pro; Arties of the classical, i.e. finite horizon model. It also presents some discussion of the role of "credit" in such models and its effect on the optimality properties of equilibrium. This is similar to the treatment by Samuelson and Cass, Yaari of the "contrivance of money" and is probably also related to Diamond' 3 "national debt" in a somewhat more general and abstract framework.
In the final section we consider some very simple two country "international trade" models and make the somewhat surprising observation that (for the infinite horizon case) steady state equilibria are possible with a permanent imbalance of trade, where one country constantly exports to the other.
The article also has a propaganda purpose. I do not claim that the non-optimalities and trade imbalances exhibited here correspond to or even necessarily throw r>uch light on the A price equilibrium is called laissez-faire in the special case when d = 0.
We now derive three simple properties of an equilibrium m Property 1.
In any price equilibrium E 6. = 0
From (I) and (11') E 6.
Property 2.
An equilibrium state (v-) is optimal.
Proof. If (Vj) is a state with v. P > . v. then from (I) P'V. > 6. so Ep'v. > E6. = 0 from Property 1, but this contradicts (II').
To describe the third property we must generalize the notion of state. Let S be a subset of the indices l,2,...,m. we recall that a converse of Property 2 was given by Arrow Cl] in which it is shown that under suitable connexity assumptions on the sets Vi• T and the preferences ~· ~ every optimal state is the state of so.e price equilibrium. Converses of Prope~ty 3 have be " given by Scarf [8] , Debreu and Scarf [5] , Vind [9] and others and are to the effect that if the number of agents is larae in an appropriate sense then the states of the core are "close to• the equilibrium states.
Property 1 has heretofore been considered s~ obvious as not to require special mention. It justifies the term transfers in describing the numbers ai. We emphasize it here, however, because like the other two properties it fails tQ hold in the open ended case. &ad this will play an important role in the later analysis.
The Samuelson Model
We turn now to infinite horizon models which can be divided into two types accordins to whet~er or not the agents are mortal or t..ortal. The second approach has been used for example by Arrow and Kurz [2] . It has, however, some disadvantages (aside froa the ~act that it runs counter to our knowledge of biology).
It requiras preference orderinas on spaces of infinite sequences and 9 .ore seriously. there are considerable difficulties in definiaa an appropriate budaet constraint. Both these difficulties vanish for the case of .artal aaents of which, however, we now need an infinite nu.ber. The simplest non-trivial model of this sort appears to be the one first formulated by Samuelson which we fmwfma.:-m^r-rr^-.
now recall. The properties to be described will be common tc all the models discussed hereafter.
The economy involves a single good which can either be consumed yielding utility or invested yielding more of itself.
People (agents) in the model live for two periods and receive an amount of goods w (w for (real) wage) only during the first period. We may think of them as actually creating the goods from their labor while they are young and vigorous. Let us call people born in period t the members of generation t and denote them by G t . A member of G. will consume amounts c. and c ' in periods t and t+1 so his opportunity set will be the positive quadrant in the plane. If p. and P t + i are the prices of goods in these same periods then consumers will want to maximize satisfaction subject to the budget equation (3.1) p t c t + P t+1 c t ' = p t w t It will usually be more convenient to divide (3.1) by p.
and obtain the equivalent form
Here p t = P t /P t+1 and is the usual interest factor.
We will also very definitely want to include the possibility of income transfers in which case (3.1)' takes the more general form (3.2) c t + c t , /p t = w t + 6 t m^~~m mmm^^F~~m~-~mmmmmmmmm r*rrr m r~m m r~r-~~m
As in the previous section (3.1)' will be called the laissez-faire case.
If we wish to solve the consumer's problem for a particular model we must have an explicit description of his preferences which is conveniently done using the usual utility func-
tion. An interesting special case is given by the function
Maximizing (3.3) subject to (3.2)
gives
(we leave to the reader the job of doing the required calculus) This is then the case where consumers save the fraction a of their income independent of prices , income being the sum of the wage and transfer payment.
Productively Inefficient Equilibria
Nothing was said in the previous section about production.
Let us now make the very simple assumption that if a unit of goods is stored (invested) it deteriorates leaving X units one period later where 0 < X < 1. (Our example is a very slight variation of that of Cass and Yaari [4] who assumed an increasing population rather than deteriorating goods. In fact part of this section will be covering the same ground as We allow any preference ordering assuming only that it gives c' > 0 (thus we eliminate the unlikely situation in which people are prepared to starve in their old age). The point is then that any such program without trade will be productively inefficient (and a fortiori non-optimal), for in each period Let us return to the model just considered and for convenience look at the special case of (3.3), (3.4) in which consumers always save the fraction o of their income. We claim that if income transfers are allowed then the following sequence of transfers and interest factors will yield an equilibrium which is also optimal. In the first period p, = l-o and 6, = a/(l-o). Thereafter p = 1 and 5=0. The total income to G, will then be 1/1-a of which it consumes 1 unit in the first period, saves the remaining a/(l-o) which at interest factor p-, is worth a in the next period. Thereafter every generation consumes (l-o,c). Since total consumption of old and young together in each period is one the program is -mssBszmsam 13 efficient and optimal. (This is just one of infinitely many ways in which optimality can be achieved by proper pricing.
It would be interesting to see whether Arrow's Theorem holds for this model so that any optimal program can be induced by suitable prices and transfers.)
The main conclusions of this section are then, (A) For infinite horizon models a price equilibrium need not be optimal. In the present example the laissez-faire equilibrium is non-optimal. Thus Properties 2 (and hence 3) of Section 2 fail to hold.
(B) By a suitable system of income transfers the optimality of equilibrium can be restored. However, such a system need not satisfy Property 1 of Section 2. In the example just considered, 00 for instance, we have I 5. = 1. t=l t
Remarks:
Because of (B) above the term "transfers" no longer seems appropriate to describe the 6.. The amount 6, added to G,'s income is not taken away from anyone else. Further, the amount 6, though measured in real (goods) units cannot be handed out in the form of goods, since there is only one unit of goods in the economy in period one and this is entirely used up in the wage. The amount 6-, is therefore a supplement in the form of a credit to G, which can be used for future consumption. This "fictitious" addition to G 's income works because of the fact that G^ wants to save anyhow. Should G, suddenly change its collective mind and demand immediate payment in goods the demands could not be met. This is reminiscent of the familiar fact that banks are not required to carry sufficient funds to cover the accounts of all their depositors.
It is now clear how money might enter the picture. The An equally attractive "story" for our example might be that the "workers" of G, were able to negotiate for themselves a wage increase 6, which resulted in the price increase p, in the next period after which things settled into the steady state.
One farther point should be made. Recall in the laissezfaire case it was argued that we cannot have p t > X, for then everyone would want to sell, giving an excess supply as there are no buyers. If one creates buyers artificially by "subsidizing" the old people or by having the "government" buy up whatever the young people don't wish to consume, then from then on the laissez-faire equilibrium proceeds smoothly with h^ transfers and inte r est rates equal to ze ro. Once th:s has been managed by one means or another the market mechanism takes care of things for ever after.
S.
Inflationar y and De flatio nary Equilibri um 5 In this section we shall exh i bit an~th e r type of no noptimality which was suggested to me by Karl Vind . W e con- The situation cari best be analyzed by referring to Figure   . ! 11 which the graph of equation (5.1) is given by the line AB. The point 0 clearly corresponds to the optimal steady state consumption and can be achieved by an equilibrium with p = 1, 6 = 0, as noted in the previous section (provided one has a mechanism for getting it started). Now, however, since number is seen to be greater than one. It follows therefore from (5.1) that 6 must be negative.
What is the economic picture that emerges from this? The negative 6 could be thought of as a government tax or in the collective bargaining interpretation it might mean that employers are able to squeeze the workers lowering wages by the amount 6-In any eise the effect is deflationary for p is greater than one so prices are falling with the result that people are badly off in their youth and better off in their old age. The deflationary equilibrium is "bad" because people would prefer in the steady state to be at 0 rather than 0'.
On the other hand, this deflationary equilibrium is optimal once it has been started for there is no way to increase the Consider first two contries C, and C* «^ch with a population and technology like those of the preceding sections, the only difference being that the rates of deterioration X-, and X2 are not the same, say A, > \~. For a laissez-faire equilibrium it then follows that the interest factor p must equal X,. Namely, it cannot be smaller for this would permit positive profits in C,, and it cannot be larger for then as in Section 3. People in both countries would want to sell whatever they did not consume, producing excess supply.
Let w_ be the wage in C ? . Then young people in C* will consume some amount c«. The rest (savings) s« = w^-c« they will sell to C, and in the next period they will buy back and consurne the amount cJ = Xs~ (here c« and s« are, of course, chosen to maximize utility). C, neither loses nor gains in this transaction and so it is compatible with equilibrium. But now observe that this pattern of trade is repeated in every period. The young people will be exporting S2 while the old will be importing s ? and thus in each period after the first there will be a net export of (1-A)s 2 units from Cj to C, (in the first period C« exports even more, namely s" units). Surely the situation is rather paradoxical.
In every period C« sends some of its national product out of the country and gets nothing in return. To an observer from outer space this would surely appear absurd. Why should people in C" be making this perpetual gift of goods to C, when they could be consuming and enjoying it themselves? Of course the people in C-, are not benefitting either since the amount they receive is simply being stored and allowed to deteriorate. This equilibrium is surely not in the core (Property 3), since C« alone could be doing better by not exporting at all. On the other hand, observe that by engaging in trade C« is better off than it would be under its own laissez-faire equilibrium since the goods it saves are deteriorating at the rate A rather than A 9 .
One might complain that the examples discussed so far have had rather non-typical production positions in that goods deteriorate rather than grow. This could have been avoided by considering durable goods and an expanding population. In any case, our final example will show that trade imbalance can exist even for "productive" technologies, of the type considered by Diamond [6] .
Consider first a single country in which population be- Finally young people according to our assumption consume the fraction 1-a of their wage and the rest is saved as input to production in the next period. This gives the simple recursion (6. 3) x t+1 = a(f(x t ) -x t f'(x t ))
We are interested here only in non-zero stationary solutions of (6.3), that is, positive values of x satisfying (6.4) x = a(f(x) -xf'(x)).
In many cases such stationary solutions will exist. For example if f(x) = Ax with 0 < a < 1 then the stationary solution is x = (aaA) Now consider two countries C, and C-of this type with identical production functions, the only difference being that the savings ratios a-, are different. Goods are freely transportable between countries so prices and therefore the interest rate is the same in both countries but the interest rate determine s the input '
(r = f (x)) so input x must be the same in both countries and input determines the wages w from (6.2) so these are also the same. be the saved by and since we are considering a stationary solution we see that total consumption in every period is higher in the country with the higher savings ratio. But inputs and outputs of production are the same in both countries, so the only way for one country to achieve more consumption is for it to import from the other country in every period, again to the bewilderment of the observer from Mars.
The paradox in this case is more apparent than real.
Suppose a 1 > a 2 and let us refer to the people of c 1 and c 2 as patient and impatient respectively. The young people in c 2 in order to satisfy their impatience are willing to borrow aoods from the patient people and pay back the loan with interest in the next pe r iod. There is really nothinc surprising about this but it looks strance to the outsid~r especially if he has not seen t he f i r s t period in which the go~ds were flowing the other way. I n a ny case this is another phenomenon which can occur in the ope n ended model but not in the classical case. 
